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ABSTRACT
This study estimates a three-sector Feder–Ram model using US annual data 
for 1965–2014 to confirm the externality of defense expenditure in the 
United States. Although the model is often used in the literature to scrutinize 
whether this effect exists, a flaw intrinsic to this model is the appearance of 
multicollinearity. In this study, I introduced novel techniques, namely: the 
standardization and estimation of a simple slope, to estimate the model. 
The results are as follows. First, I prove that the multicollinearity problem 
can be resolved by standardization. Second, externality, which is judged to 
conventionally exist, is not found. Third, increases in defense expenditure 
bring about positive but limited economic growth when the ratio of private 
to defense expenditure in the previous year ranges from 5.09 to 6.82%. By re-
estimating the model, this study contributes to developing the Feder–Ram 
model within the related literature.
Introduction
This study aims to construct a new method to estimate the Feder–Ram model using US annual data for 
1965–2014 to overcome multicollinearity, explore the externality and direct effects of defense expend-
iture, and reevaluate the model. Since the cold war, defense economists have posed fundamental 
questions such as whether defense expenditure stimulates or damages economic growth and, if so, 
how and by to what extent. Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel (2005) classify the effects as demand, 
supply, and security effects. While defense expenditure creates effective demand and brings about 
economic growth through the Keynesian multiplier effect (Alexander 2015; Barro and Redlick 2009; 
Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel 2005; Dunne 2012; Lee, Lee, and Wu 2016), it might crowd-out public 
investment under budget constraints or private investment by increases in interest rates when defense 
expenditure is financed by issuing debt (Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel 2005; Gold 1997; Morales-
Ramos 2002; Scott 2001). In addition, defense expenditure could strengthen the supply side of the 
economy by increasing productive labor in the civilian sector, which was subject to severe disciplinary 
action by the armed forces, and a spin-off with a time lag in military technologies developed through 
military R&D on the technologies of private high-tech companies (Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel 
2005; Lichtenberg 1991). By contrast, since military capital stock is non-profitable, distorted resource 
allocation in budgets could lower increases in productivity in the economy.1 Finally, defense could deter 
the outbreak of a war, protect life and property, and provide a peaceful social basis, which is essential 
for market operations (Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel 2005). It is evident that should war break out 
between nations, a national economy would be in a dilemma and partly cease; this is also the case 
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for domestic conflict and terrorism. Therefore, defense expenditure has the potential to assure peace, 
on which a country’s usual economic activities and market mechanism are based, and contribute to 
economic growth.
Several defense economists have shown interest in the empirical analyses of the defense–growth 
nexus. Two key concepts of the supply side approach are a ‘direct or indirect link’ and ‘externality’, which 
have been developed by numerous defense economists following the 1990s. The direct or indirect link 
approach was developed by Huang and Mintz (1990), following whom Mintz and Huang (1991), Cohen 
et al. (1996), and Heo (1999, 2000) investigated the direct and short-term effects of defense expend-
iture on economic growth and the indirect and long-term effects on economic growth as a whole 
through changes in production factors (e.g. investment and labor input) brought about by government 
spending. ‘Externality’ is defined as the elasticity of defense expenditure for the non-defense sector 
or private sector economy. When analyzing externality, the Feder–Ram model based on a neoclassical 
production function is employed in the defense economics literature (Alexander 1990; Ando 2000; 
Ando 2009; Atesoglu and Mueller 1990; Augier et al. 2017; DeRouen 2000; Heo 1996, 1998, 2010; Heo 
and DeRouen 1998; Huang and Mintz 1991; Macnair et al. 1995; Mueller and Atesoglu 1993; Mintz and 
Stevenson 1995; Ward, Davis, and Lofdahl 1995). However, Huang and Mintz (1991), HEO (1996), and 
Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel (2005) point out the possibility of overestimating externalities resulting 
from the appearance of multicollinearity in the model. Huang and Mintz (1991) and Heo (1996) attempt 
to avoid the appearance of multicollinearity using a Ridge regression, although no defense economist 
has used this regression, and Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel (2005, 459) even recommend against 
it. Therefore, there is a need to understand or introduce a new technique that estimates externality.
In this study, I first introduce a standardization approach to avoid a multicollinearity problem. Next, 
I employ a simple slope approach to estimate the impacts of changes in defense expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP on the growth rate of the economy as a whole and demonstrate its use. The new 
technique allows for a comparison of conventionally estimated results with those obtained using a 
new method and a presentation of how different interpretations can be made from the results derived 
using the new technique.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a literature review. Section 3 intro-
duces two estimated equations of the three-sector model: one is an equation conventionally used to 
estimate the Feder–Ram model and the other avoids the multicollinearity problem. Section 4 presents 
the descriptive statistics and definitions of dependent and independent variables as well as the sources 
of data for macroeconomic variables; thereafter, I explain the methodology adopted in this study. 
Section 5 presents the results of the two equations, which offer an alternative interpretation of the 
effect of increased defense and non-defense expenditure on growth rate. In addition, drawing on the 
results from the newly introduced Equation (17), the range in which a rise in expenditure statistically 
and significantly affects economic growth is illustrated graphically. Section 6 provides a discussion, 
conclusion, and policy implications.
Literature Review
A plethora of studies have examined the effects of defense expenditure on economic growth both 
during the cold war era as well as in the post-bipolar period (inter alia: Compton and Paterson 2016; 
Dunne and Tian 2015; Yilgör, Karagöl, and Saygili 2014; Dunne 2012; Wijeweera and Webb 2011; Augier 
et al. 2017; Alexander 1990; Heo and DeRouen 1998; Mueller and Atesoglu 1993; Mintz and Huang 
1991; Ward, Davis, and Lofdahl 1995). A critical survey of the reported empirical findings can be found 
in Dunne and Tian (2013) and Alptekin and Levine (2012). In particular, in 1989, with the end of the cold 
war, two concepts began to attract the attention of defense economists analyzing the defense–growth 
nexus using a supply side approach: the direct or indirect link and externality. Huang and Mintz’s (1990) 
direct or indirect link approach constructs and estimates multiple equations and investigates both 
direct or indirect and static or dynamic impacts (Cohen et al. 1996; Heo 1999, 2000; Huang and Mintz 
1990; Mintz and Huang 1991). They clarify that defense spending on US economic growth did not have 
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a significant direct and short-term effect, but a significant indirect and long-term negative impact on 
the economy through changes in investment brought about by modifications in defense expenditure. 
Mintz and Huang (1991), Cohen et al. (1996), and Heo (1999) also support the indirect and delayed effect 
of defense spending for the United States, Israel, and South Korea, respectively. In addition, Heo (2000) 
finds no evidence for the direct effect of defense expenditure in the United States.
On the other hand, Feder (1983) and Ram’s (1986) concept of externality helps understand the 
short-term effects of defense expenditure on growth. Huang and Mintz (1991), who applied the neo-
classical economics approach to the defense–growth relationship, and Mueller and Atesoglu (1993), 
who developed the nonlinear model with technical progress, drew defense economists’ attention to 
the externality of defense expenditure and triggered many empirical analyses on externalities by coun-
try-specific (Ando 2000; Atesoglu and Mueller 1990; Augier et al. 2017; DeRouen 2000; Heo 1996; Heo 
2010; Huang and Mintz 1991; Mueller and Atesoglu 1993; Ward, Davis, and Lofdahl 1995) and panel 
data studies (Alexander 1990; Ando 2009; Heo 1998; Heo and DeRouen 1998; Macnair et al. 1995; 
Mintz and Stevenson 1995). Most country-specific analyses adopt US macroeconomic data (J. Ando 
2000; Atesoglu and Mueller 1990; Heo 2010; Huang and Mintz 1991; Mueller and Atesoglu 1993) but 
fail to find significant externality. In particular, HEO (1996), DeRouen (2000), and Augier et al. (2017) 
focus on South Korea, Israel, and China, respectively, but none of them show evidence of significant 
externality2. Alexander (1990), to the best of my knowledge, was the first to employ the Feder–Ram 
model in a panel data analysis. He estimates a four-sector model for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden for 1974–1985, but finds no evidence 
supporting significant externality for all nine countries. Mintz and Stevenson (1995) prove that of 103 
countries, positive or negative externality was found for seven countries (Austria, Congo, West Germany, 
Guatemala, Morocco, Pakistan, and Singapore). Macnair et al. (1995) in a unique study that incorporates 
spill-ins from NATO alliances in the model reveal that defense expenditure in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States had 
positive and significant externality during 1950–1988. Ando (2000), using panel data for 28 developed 
and 81 developing countries for 1995–2003, shows that defense expenditure by both developed and 
developing countries has positive externality.
Specifications
Let a country’s economy Y comprise three sectors: the non-governmental sector or private sector P, 
non-defense sector N, and defense sector D.
 
The three-sector economies are described using the neoclassical production function and N and M are 
assumed to affect P as follows:
 
 
 
where K is capital stock; L is labor input; and the lowercase subscripts p, n, and d represent each sector.
From the partial differentials of Equations (2)–(4) in relation to the two production factors in each 
sector, I obtain the following relationships:
 
 
(1)Y = P + N + D.
(2)P = P(Kp, Lp,N,D),
(3)N = N(Kn, Ln),
(4)D = D(Kd , Ld),
(5)휕P∕휕Kp = PKp .
(6)휕P∕휕Lp = PLp .
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Furthermore, I postulate that the ratios of the marginal productivity of K and L in the non-defense 
and defense sectors to those in the private sector with a difference of δn and δd, respectively, and the 
private sector economy can be written as a Cobb–Douglas production function:
 
 
 
where θn is the externality from the non-defense sector to the private sector and θd is the externality from 
the defense sector to the private sector. Solving for ΔY/Y−1, I obtain a final equation for the estimation:
 
where Y is real gross domestic product (GDP); I is real private investment; L is labor input (= numbers of 
employees × weekly average work hours in the non-farm, private sector); P is private expenditure, that 
is non-governmental expenditure; N and D are governmental non-defense and defense expenditure; 
and ε is an error term. Δ denotes the first differential of the variable from the previous year to the current 
year. Subscript-1 indicates that it is a macroeconomic variable in the previous year. In Equation (14),
 
and
 
Equation (14) is a typical equation used in the literature (Alexander 1990; Huang and Mintz 1991; Ward, 
Davis, and Lofdahl 1995) and can be rewritten as follows:
 
where the mean and standard deviation of ΔN/Y−1, P−1/N−1, ΔD/Y−1, and P−1/D−1 are standardized to 0 
and 1 to avoid multicollinearity. In this study, both Equations (14) and (15) are estimated for comparison 
because the estimation of Equation (14) can reveal a different estimated coefficient and the statistical 
significance of the externality of defense expenditure from those obtained using conventional methods.
Data and Methodology
Data
Tables 1–5 present the descriptive statistics, correlation matrix of independent variables, and results 
of the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) for non-standardized and standardized variables. Table 3 shows 
a strong correlation between ΔN/Y−1 and (ΔN/N−1)(P−1/ Y−1) and between ΔD/Y−1 and (ΔD/D−1)(P−1/Y 
−1). The correlation coefficients exceed 0.9, which provides evidence that they produce a problem of 
multicollinearity.
(7)휕N∕휕Kn = NKn .
(8)휕N∕휕Ln = NLn .
(9)휕D∕휕Kd = DKd .
(10)휕D∕휕Ld = DLd .
(11)NKn∕PKp = NLn∕PLp = 1 + 훿n,
(12)DKd∕PKp = DLd∕PLp = 1 + 훿d ,
(13)P = P(Kp, Lp,N,D) ≡ N
휃n
⋅ D휃d ⋅ 휓(Kp, Lp),
(14)ΔY∕Y−1 = intercept + 훼 ⋅ (I∕Y−1) + 훽 ⋅ (ΔL∕L−1) + 훿
�
n
⋅ (ΔN∕Y−1) + 휃n ⋅ (ΔN∕N−1)(P−1∕Y−1)
+ 훿�
d
⋅ (ΔD∕Y−1) + 휃d ⋅ (ΔD∕D−1)(P−1∕Y−1) + 휀1
(15)훿�n = 훿n∕(1 + 훿n)
(16)훿�d = 훿d∕(1 + 훿d).
(17)
ΔY∕Y−1 = intercept + 훼 ⋅ (I∕Y−1) + 훽 ⋅ (ΔL∕L−1) + 훿
�
n ⋅ (ΔN∕Y−1) + 휃n ⋅ (ΔN∕Y−1)(P−1∕N−1)
+ 훿�
d
⋅ (ΔD∕Y−1) + 휃d ⋅ (ΔD∕Y−1)(P−1∕D−1) + 휀1
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One technique to reduce multicollinearity is dropping variables that are collinear, but all independent 
variables cannot be dropped because their estimated coefficients provide us with important information 
about the economy. Thus, in this paper, a standardization technique is used for the dependent and all 
independent variables. Standardization is performed by the equation below:
 
where X is a variable, and X̄  and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the variable, respectively. 
As can be understood, Equation (18) produces no losses of information of variable X. ADF tests are 
conducted because when using time series data, if the hypothesis that at least one of the variables 
(18)Z =
(
X − X̄
)
𝜎
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (non-standardized variables).
Period 1965–2014 (n = 50)
Variable Min. Max. Mean S.D.
ΔY
Y−1
−0.028 0.073 0.030 0.021 
I
Y−1
0.116 0.197 0.155 0.021 
ΔL
L−1
−0.068 0.061 0.015 0.026 
ΔN
Y−1
−0.011 0.015 0.001 0.005 
(
ΔN
N−1
)(
P−1
Y−1
) −7.011 8.921 0.776 3.871 
ΔD
Y−1
−0.005 0.013 0.004 0.004 
(
ΔD
D−1
)(
P−1
Y−1
) −2.619 4.440 1.612 1.489 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (standardized variables).
aattached to the variable means that the variables are standardized for the mean and the standard error to be 0 and 1, respectively.
battached to the variable means that each fractional number consisting of the variable is standardized for the mean and the stand-
ard error to be 0 and 1, respectively.
Period 1965–2014 (n = 50)
Variable Min. Max. Mean S.D.
ΔY
Y−1
a −2.684 2.003 0.000 1.000 
I
Y−1
a −1.933 2.021 0.000 1.000 
ΔL
L−1
a −3.211 1.777 0.000 1.000 
ΔN
Y−1
a −2.510 3.110 0.000 1.000 
(
ΔN
Y−1
)(
P−1
N−1
)
b −4.778 3.449 0.030 1.284 
ΔD
Y−1
a −2.491 2.360 0.000 1.000 
(
ΔD
Y−1
)(
P−1
D−1
)
b −3.319 0.777 −0.509 1.058 
Table 3. correlation matrix.
ΔI/Y−1 ΔL/L−1 ΔN/Y−1
(
ΔN
N−1
)(
P−1
Y−1
)
ΔD/Y−1
(
ΔD
D−1
)(
P−1
Y−1
)
ΔI/Y−1 1.0000 
ΔL/L−1 0.3533 1.0000 
ΔN/Y−1 −0.1914 0.1173 1.0000 (
ΔN
N−1
)(
P−1
Y−1
)
−0.0821 0.0684 0.9768 1.0000 
ΔD/Y−1
0.0411 −0.0613 0.2911 0.2898 1.0000 
(
ΔD
D−1
)(
P−1
Y−1
)
0.0736 −0.2194 0.2246 0.2540 0.9263 1.0000 
6  J. ANDO
is not co-integrated order one is not rejected, the regression could be spurious. In Tables 4 and 5, the 
number of lags for ADF tests is chosen using Schwartz criterion. They show that when a constant and 
a trend are included in the ADF test, I/Y−1, ΔD/Y−1, (ΔD/D−1)(P−1/Y−1), standardized I/Y−1, standardized 
ΔD/Y−1, and standardized (ΔN/Y−1)(P−1/N−1) are integrated order one, which means that these variables 
are non-stationary, and the regressions might be spurious.
In Equations (14) and (17), the dependent variable ΔY/Y−1 is the growth rate of the economy as a 
whole. Independent variables common to both equations (14) and (17) include the ratio of private 
investment to GDP in the previous year, I/Y−1; the growth rate of labor input, ΔL/L−1; the ratio of an incre-
ment in non-defense expenditure to GDP in the previous year, ΔN/Y−1; and the ratio of the increment 
in defense expenditure to GDP in the previous year, ΔD/Y−1. Thus, the coefficients of ΔN/Y−1 and ΔD/Y−1 
(훿′n and 훿
′
d
,) describe the effects of non-defense and defense expenditure on economic growth. Two 
interaction terms between the growth rate of non-defense expenditure, ΔN/N−1, and the ratio of private 
expenditure to GDP in the previous year, P−1/Y−1, and between the growth rate of defense expenditure, 
ΔD/D−1, and P−1/Y−1 are included as independent variables in Equation (14). As dependent variables in 
Equation (17), two different interaction terms between ΔN/Y−1 and the ratio of private expenditure to 
non-defense expenditure, P−1/N−1, and between the ratio of the increment in defense expenditure to 
GDP in the previous year, ΔD/Y−1, and the ratio of private expenditure to defense expenditure, P−1/D−1, 
are used. The data source of Y, G, P, D, N, and I are GDP & Personal Income, provided by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (2015, US Department of Commerce); these data are expressed in billion dollars 
at 2009 constant prices. The numbers of employees and weekly average work hours in the non-farm, 
private sector were obtained from Tables & Calculators by Subject, supplied by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2015, US Department of Labor).
Table 4. Results of augmented Dickey–fuller test (non-standardized variables).
note: *, **, ***, and † mean that the variable is statistically significant at 0.1, 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Variable No interceptNo trend InterceptNo trend InterceptTrend
ΔY
Y−1
I (0)** I (0)*** I (0)***
I
Y−1
I (1)*** I (1)*** I (1)***
ΔL
L−1
I (0)*** I (0)*** I (0)***
ΔN
Y−1
a I (0)* I (0)* I (0)*(
ΔN
N−1
)(
P−1
Y−1
)
I (0)* I (0)* I (0)*
ΔD
Y−1
I (0)** I (0)† I (1)***
(
ΔD
D−1
)(
P−1
Y−1
)
I (0)* I (1)*** I (1)***
Table 5. Results of augmented Dickey–fuller test (standardized variables).
notes: *, **, ***, and † mean that the variable is statistically significant at 0.1, 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
aattached to the variable means that the variables are standardized for the mean and the standard error to be 0 and 1, respectively.
battached to the variable means that each fractional number consisting of the variable is standardized for the mean and the stand-
ard error to be 0 and 1, respectively.
Variable No interceptNo trend InterceptNo trend Intercept Trend
ΔY
Y−1
a I (0)*** I (0)*** I (0)***
I
Y−1
a I (0)* I (1)*** I (1)***
ΔL
L−1
a I (0)*** I (0)*** I (0)***
ΔN
Y−1
a I (0)** I (0)* I (0)*
(
ΔN
Y−1
)(
P−1
N−1
)
b I (0)* I (0)† I (1)***
ΔD
Y−1
a I (0)** I (0)† I (1)***
(
ΔD
Y−1
)(
P−1
D−1
)
b I (0)** I (0)* I (0)†
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Methodology
In this study, I present a new technique to analyze the direct effect and externality of defense expendi-
ture. It consists of two steps: first, the standardization of the dependent and all independent variables, 
which helps avoid the appearance of multicollinearity in the estimation of Equation (17), and second, 
the estimation of the simple slope of ΔN/Y−1 and ΔD/Y−1 using the values of P−1/N−1 and P−1/D−1.
First, we begin with standardization. Assume that dependent variable Y is regressed on X1 and 
interaction term X1X2 as follows:
 
In Equation (19), X1 and X1X2 are likely to produce severe multicollinearity, in particular for time series 
data. Consider economic time series data as an example. Since it is usually composed of only positive 
data, the product of smaller values of X1 and X2 itself becomes a smaller value, which leads to the 
appearance of strong correlation between X1 and X1X2. However, standardization of X1 and X2 for mean 
and standard deviation to be 0 and 1, respectively, transforms positive values below the mean to be neg-
ative ones, which makes product of two negative standardized values to be positive values. Therefore, 
this reduces the degree of correlation between the dependent variable X1 and interaction term X1X2.
Second, we advance to the estimation of the simple slope. Equation (19) can be rewritten as:
 
Equation (20) indicates that Y depends not only on X1 but also on X2. X2 is a moderator and a2 + a3X2 is 
a simple slope. If X2 is a continuous variable, the value of the simple slope is not unique. Thus, infinite 
numbers of the value exist, and the value of the simple slope changes even for a given value of X1 as 
the moderator X2 changes. Since it is impossible to estimate all the values, the mean of X2, the mean 
plus 1 standard deviation of X2, and the mean minus 1 standard deviation of X2 are generally selected 
as examples and used to estimate the simple slope and its statistical significance. In Equation (20), the 
standard error of the simple slope SESS is given by:
 
where Var(a1) and Var(a2), that is the variances of a1 and a2, are the squared standard errors of a1 and a2, 
which can be obtained from the empirical result, and Cov(a1, a2), the covariance of a1 and a2, can be found 
in the covariance matrix provided by representative econometrics software following the estimation.
In this study, this simple slope analysis is applied to estimate 훿′n and 훿
′
d
 in Equation (17), in which 
P−1/N−1 is considered a moderator for 훿
′
n and P−1/D−1 for 훿
′
d
. When estimating the simple slope of ΔN/Y−1 
and ΔD/Y−1, continuous variables P−1/N−1 and P−1/D−1 are intentionally converted to discrete variables 
with a given interval and the ranges of the two standardized variables are limited to the minimum and 
maximum values, which enables us to roughly understand how the values and t-statistics of 훿′n and 훿
′
d
 
change as P−1/N−1 and P−1/D−1 change in the range. An interval is deliberately set, but the smaller an 
interval, the more precisely we can understand changes in the values and t-statistics of 훿′n and 훿
′
d
. In 
this study, an interval between two neighboring values of the standardized P−1/N−1 and P−1/D−1 is set 
to 0.01. If time permits, an interval can be further segmented and set to be smaller one, such as 0.001, 
0.0001, and 0.00001. As shown in Table 1, for the standardized P−1/N−1, the maximum and minimum 
values are −1.59 and 2.29, and for the standardized P−1/D−1, they are −1.69 and 1.79. This means there 
are 389 values between −1.59 and 2.29 for the standardized P−1/N−1 and 349 values between −1.69 and 
1.79 for the standardized P−1/D−1.
Following Ai and Norton (2003), Norton, Hua, and Ai (2004), and Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), 
I estimate 훿′n, the coefficient of a fractional number ΔN/Y−1 of the interaction term (ΔN/Y−1) (P−1/N−1), 
and the standard errors and t-values of 훿′n for each P−1/N−1. I choose 2.29 from 389 standardized P−1/N−1 
as an example. As mentioned, in Equation (17), the simple slope is termed a2 + a3X2. Therefore, in com-
bination with the results for (A2) in Table 3, the simple slope for ΔN/Y−1 is equal to 훿
′
n (= 0.2665344) + 
(19)Y = a1 + a2X1 + a3X1X2.
(20)Y = a1 + (a2 + a3X2)X1.
(21)SESS =
√
Var(a1) + 2X2Cov(a1, a2) + (X2)
2Var(a2),
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θn (= 0.0078016) × standardized P−1/N−1 (= 2.29)= 0.284400064. Although they are not included in the 
study, Var(a1), Var(a2), and Cov(a1, a2) are 0.0708674
2, 0.06899532, and –0.00036067, respectively. In 
this case, X2 is 2.29. Then, the standard error of the simple slope with respect to ΔN/Y−1 is calculated as 
0.168327296. The t-value of the simple slope is obtained by dividing the value of the simple slope by 
the standard error, which is equal to 1.6896 (= 0.284400064/0.168327296) and significant at the 10% 
level. This process is repeated for 388 standardized P−1/N−1. Likewise, the simple slopes, standard errors, 
and t-values are calculated for 349 standardized P−1/D−1.
Empirical Analysis
Table 6 presents the results of the three-sector Feder–Ram model. The result of Equation (14), which is 
conventionally used in the defense economics literature, is shown in the first column in the table. The 
result demonstrates that externalities from non-defense and defense expenditure are –0.008 and 0.002, 
and that the latter is significant, while the former is not. In other words, a 1% rise in the size of the defense 
expenditure leads to a 0.002% annual growth of the private sector. Furthermore, a rise in non-defense 
expenditure, ΔN/Y−1, is positively and significantly related to the dependent variable, but a rise in 
defense expenditure, ΔD/Y−1, is negatively and significantly related to the dependent variable, which 
means that an increase in non-defense expenditure stimulates the US economy, but a rise in defense 
expenditure dampens it. δn and δd, which are calculated from the statistically significant values of 훿
′
n and 
훿
′
d
, are −0.257 and 0.379. That is, productivity in the defense sector exceeds that in the private sector, 
but productivity in the non-defense sector is smaller than that in the private sector. Note that vector 
inflation factors (VIFs) of the size effect of non-defense expenditure, its combined effect, the size effect 
of defense expenditure, and its combined effect are judged high enough for collinearities to appear.3 
R̄2 exceeds 0.8, which indicates that the explanatory power of Equation (14) is high. Since DW is 1.917, 
Table 6. Results of the feder–Ram model.
notes: *** and † mean that the variable is statistically significant at 0.1% and 10%, respectively.
aVariables are standardized for the mean and standard error to be 0 and 1, respectively.
beach fractional number consisting of the variable is standardized for the mean and standard error to be 0 and 1, respectively.
Equation (A1) (A2)
Method OLS OLS
Variable Coef. t-value VIF Coef. t-value VIF
constant −0.007 −0.497 −0.001 −0.015
I
Y−1
0.125 1.288 2.210 0.060 0.829 1.290
ΔL
L−1
0.681 9.347*** 1.940 0.860 10.985*** 1.490 
ΔN
Y−1
4.894 1.980† 44.370 
(
ΔN
N−1
)(
P−1
Y−1
)
−0.008 −1.347 41.130 
ΔD
Y−1
−1.642 −1.803† 9.360 
(
ΔD
D−1
)(
P−1
Y−1
)
0.002 1.984† 9.790 
ΔN
Y−1
a 0.267 3.761*** 1.220 
(
ΔN
Y−1
)(
P−1
N−1
)
b 0.008 0.113 1.300 
ΔD
Y−1
a 0.200 1.599 3.810 
(
ΔD
Y−1
)(
P−1
D−1
)
b 0.166 1.623 4.210 
δn −0.257 1.363 
δd 0.379 1.250 
R̄
2 0.806 0.799 
SE 0.009 0.448 
DW 1.917 1.937
F 34.90*** 33.460***
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we can reject the hypothesis of a serial correlation in the result at the 5% level. The F-statistic is 34.90, 
from which we can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero in the result at the 0.01% level.
The result from Equation (17), introduced in the study to avoid the appearance of multicollinearity, 
is shown in column (A2). Clearly, the VIFs of these six independent variables become lower than those 
in column (A1) and sufficiently so to judge that the multicollinearity problem could be resolved. The 
coefficients of the third and fourth independent variables are estimated smaller than those in column 
(A1), while those of the fifth and sixth independent variables are estimated larger than those in col-
umn (A1). In particular, 훿′n, the coefficient of the third independent variable, turned out to be positive. 
In addition to the insignificant θn, θd is not shown to be significantly different from zero, even at the 
10% level. Therefore, unlike the result from Equation (14), we cannot say that externalities from both 
the defense and private sectors exist. R̄2 is almost 0.8, which indicates that the explanatory power of 
Equation (17) is also high. DW is 1.937, and thus, we can reject the hypothesis of a serial correlation in 
the result at the 5% level. Since the F-statistic is 33.46, we can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
are zero at the 0.01% level.
In Figure 1, we see how the values and t-statistics of 훿′n change for each non-standardized P−1/D−1. 
훿
′
n ranges from 0.2541 to 0.2844, which is consistently significant at no less than the 10% level in the 
range. 훿′n, which is calculated from a statistically significant δn shown in Figure 2, ranges from 0.3407 to 
0.3974. This means that the productivity of the non-defense sector exceeds that of the private sector 
by those values in the period. In addition, the values and t-statistics of 훿′
d
 can be found in Figure 3, 
which shows that 훿′
d
 declines from 0.4971 to −0.0808 as P−1/D−1 rises from 5.09 to 19.24%. However, it 
is only when P−1/D−1 ranges from 5.09 to 6.82% that 훿
′
d
 is positively and significantly different from zero; 
it takes 0.2979 as a minimum value and 0.4972 as a maximum value. δd is shown in Figure 4, ranging 
from −0.0748 to 0.9887. When P−1/D−1 is between 5.09 and 6.82%, the productivity of the defense sector 
is higher than that of the private sector by 0.4242–0.9887, but once P−1/D−1 is greater than 6.82%, this 
difference disappears.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, a three-sector Feder–Ram model was estimated using 1965–2014 US annual data. From the 
empirical results, the following conclusions were drawn. First, it was proved that rewriting interaction 
terms and the standardization of all variables allow us to overcome the multicollinearity problem, which 
the defense economics literature has pointed out is intrinsic to the model. Second, unlike the result 
Figure 1. Values and t-statistics of 훿′
n
.
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of the conventional estimation, which implies that positive externality exists, these new techniques 
elucidated that externality from the defense expenditure to the private sector does not exist. Third, by 
reformulating two independent variables as discrete variables, the increases in defense expenditure 
bring about positive but limited economic growth when P−1/D−1 ranges from 5.09 to 6.82%, which 
cannot be detected with conventional analyses and interpretations of results.
As Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel (2005) point out, the Feder–Ram model is posed with 
problems other than multicollinearity. One of these is the static characteristics of the model: 
a lagged independent variable associated with defense expenditure is not incorporated. Thus, 
to confirm a dynamic effect of defense expenditure on the economy as a whole, the direct 
or indirect model or the augmented Solow model is preferable to the Feder–Ram model. In 
addition, the Feder–Ram model can be arbitrarily arranged. For example, if following the 
specification of Augier et al. (2017), the model can be specified as:
Figure 3. Values and t-statistics of 훿′
d
.
Figure 2. Values of δ.
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where β4 and β6 mean θm and θn. Augier et al. (2017) estimate Equation (22) and show that the exter-
nality of Chinese defense expenditure is negative but non-significant. However, as is clear in Equation 
(22), β4 denotes externality from defense expenditure to the private sector economy and, at the same 
time, the direct effect of defense expenditure on overall economic growth, which assumes that the 
elasticity of defense expenditure for the private sector economy is equal to a contribution led by a 1% 
rise in defense expenditure to a rise in the overall economy.
Furthermore, the Feder–Ram model does not account for the net exports and imports of conven-
tional weapons. When estimating the model, defense expenditure is used for the production of defense 
sector economy D, but value-added produced in the defense industry is purchased by not only a coun-
try’s government but also other countries’ governments. The Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (2016) reports that total arms exports from the United States to other countries and total arms 
imports from other countries to the United States from 1965 to 2014 amount to 528,275 million and 
30,266 million US dollars (1990 constant prices). Finally, annual, not quarterly, data are generally used 
to estimate the Feder–Ram model. If considered a tool of fiscal policy, like in the case of other crucial 
government spending, defense expenditure should also be used to estimate the model.
The Feder–Ram model informs us about parameters which we cannot easily know such as α, that is 
marginal productivity of capital in the private sector; and δd, a difference between marginal productivity 
of K and L in the defense sector and that of K and L in the private sector. In addition, estimation of the 
three-sector model could enable us to find an effect of conversion of a government’s budget from the 
defense sector to a non-defense sector. This is the reason why the Feder–Ram model is used in spite of 
some estimation problems in this paper.
In this paper, time series data are used for the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. It is well known 
that the OLS estimator is a desirable estimator in that it has three characteristics, that is unbiasedness, 
consistency, and efficiency when the error term ɛi meets all the conditions below:
 
 
 
(22)
ΔY∕Y−1 = 훽0 + 훽1 ⋅
(
ΔL∕L−1
)
+ 훽
2
⋅
(
I∕Y−1
)
+ 훽
3
⋅
(
D−1∕Y−1
)
(ΔD∕D−1)
+ 훽
4
⋅ (ΔD∕D−1) + 훽5 ⋅
(
N−1∕Y−1
)
(ΔN∕N−1) + 훽6 ⋅ (ΔN∕N−1),
(23)E(휀i) = 0
(24)V (휀i) = 휎
2
(25)휀i ∼ N(0, 휎
2)
Figure 4 Values of δd.
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where ɛk is the kth error term (k = 1, 2, i,…, j,…, n), E is the expectation operator, V is variance, and N(0, σ
2) 
means a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2. If even one of the conditions is not met, at 
least one of the above characteristics is lost. Further, this paper uses time series data. As mentioned 
above, when it is non-stationary, the regression could be spurious. In fact, some dependent variables 
show co-integration with order one. Thus, from an economic policy point of view, other methods such 
as a Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) should be used for the empirical analysis of defense expenditure.
Many defense economists have been interested in whether defense expenditure has a positive/
negative impact on the economy, and the composition of the economy, that is the ratios of P, N, D for 
the economy, which could stimulate/harm the economy. This new method could help economists find 
this threshold. These improvements in the re-estimation of the model could lead defense economists 
to find completely different values for the externality of defense expenditure and draw novel policy 
implications from the results.4
Notes
1.  For example, Japan is said to have enjoyed a high productivity increase rate under its low defense spending to 
GDP ratio; the share was consistently around 1% in the cold war era.
2.  Ward, Davis, and Lofdahl (1995) explore the changing externality for the United States for 1890–1991 and Japan 
for 1880–1990, although they do find statistical significances for the externality of defense expenditure.
3.  When the VIF of an independent variable exceeds 10, we often judge that multicollinearity occurs. In this strict 
meaning, we can also think that multicollinearity does not occur for ΔD/Y−1 and (ΔD/D−1)(P−1/Y−1).
4.  Since a large portion of their defense expenditure outflows to other countries and creates effective demand, the 
re-estimation of the Feder–Ram model is needed and defense expenditure is not adequate for D in the model, 
especially for developing countries where the defense industry is yet to mature and small.
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Appendix 1
Herein, the process through which Equation (14) is derived from Equations (1)–(13), (15), and (16) is presented. Differentiating 
both sides of Equation (2) in relation to time, I obtain the following:
 
where
 
and
 
By definition, capital stock in the private sector can be expressed as:
 
Substituting Equation (31) into Equation (28) gives us:
 
In addition, the total differentiation of Equations (3) and (4) in relation to time leads to:
 
and
 
Since Y is defined as:
 
Equation (35) holds as:
 
Substituting Equations (32)–(34) into Equation (36), we obtain:
 
The following equations can be obtained from Equations (11) and (12):
 
 
 
 
If we substitute Equations (38)–(41), we obtain:
(28)Ṗ = PKp ⋅ K̇p + PLp ⋅ L̇p + PN ⋅ Ṅ + PD ⋅ Ḋ,
(29)PN = 휕P∕휕M
(30)PD = 휕P∕휕D.
(31)K̇p ≡ Ip .
(32)Ṗ = PKp ⋅ Ip + PLp ⋅ L̇p + PN ⋅ Ṅ + PD ⋅ Ḋ.
(33)Ṅ = NKn ⋅ K̇n + NLn ⋅ L̇N = NKn ⋅ In + NLn ⋅ L̇n
(34)Ḋ = DKd ⋅ K̇d + DLd ⋅ L̇d = DKd ⋅ Id + DLd ⋅ L̇d .
(35)Y = P + N + D
(36).Ẏ = Ṗ + Ṅ + Ḋ.
(37)Ẏ = PKp ⋅ Ip + PLp ⋅ L̇p + PN ⋅ Ṅ + PD ⋅ Ḋ + NKn ⋅ In + NLn ⋅ L̇n + DKd ⋅ Id + DLd ⋅ L̇d .
(38)NKn = (1 + 훿n) ⋅ PKp ,
(39)NLn = (1 + 훿n) ⋅ PLp ,
(40)DKd = (1 + 훿d) ⋅ DKd ,
(41)DLd = (1 + 훿d) ⋅ DLd .
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Then, substituting Equations (33) and (34) into Equation (28), Ṅ can be rewritten as:
 
Therefore,
 
Likewise, from Equations (33), (39), and (40), we obtain:
 
Furthermore, substituting Equations (43) and (44) into Equation (41), Ẏ  can be described as:
 
Here, I define marginal productivity of capital in the private sector as:
 
and assume a linear relationship between the marginal productivity of labor in the private sector and total output per 
capita as follows:
 
If we substitute Equations (15), (16), (42), and (48) into Equation (46) and divide both sides by Y, we obtain:
 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of Equation (13),
 
The partial differentiation of both sides by ln Nleads to:
 
Likewise,
 
If Equations (51) and (52) are substituted into Equation (44), we obtain:
 
Finally, if Equation (53) is described in a discrete form and an intercept and error term are added to Equation (53), we 
derive Equation (14).
(42)Ẏ = PKp ⋅ I + PLp ⋅ L̇p + 𝛿n ⋅ (PKp ⋅ In + PLp ⋅ L̇n) + 𝛿d ⋅ (PKp ⋅ Id + PLp ⋅ L̇d) + PN ⋅ Ṅ + PD ⋅ Ḋ.
(43)Ṅ = (1 + 𝛿n) ⋅ PKp ⋅ In + (1 + 𝛿n) ⋅ PLp ⋅ L̇n = (1 + 𝛿n) ⋅ (PKp ⋅ In + PLp ⋅ L̇n).
(44)PKp ⋅ In + PLp ⋅ L̇n = Ṅ∕(1 + 𝛿n).
(45)PKp ⋅ Id + PLp ⋅ L̇d = Ḋ∕(1 + 𝛿d).
(46)Y = PKp ⋅ I + PLp ⋅ L̇ + [𝛿n∕(1 + 𝛿n) + PN] ⋅ Ṅ + [𝛿d∕(1 + 𝛿n) + PD] ⋅ Ḋ.
(47)PKp ≡ 훼
(48)PLp = 훽 ⋅ (Y∕L).
(49)Ẏ∕Y = 𝛼 ⋅ (I∕Y) + 𝛽 ⋅ (L̇∕L) + (𝛿�n + PN) ⋅ (Ṅ∕Y) + (𝛿
�
d
+ PM) ⋅ (Ḋ∕Y).
(50)ln P = 휃n ⋅ lnN + 휃m ⋅ lnD + lnΦ(Kp , Lp).
(51)휕 ln P∕휕 lnN = (휕P∕P)∕(휕N∕N) = (휕P∕휕N) ⋅ (N∕P) = PN ⋅ (P∕N) = 휃n .
(52)휕 ln P∕휕 lnD = PD ⋅ (P∕D) = 휃d .
(53)
Ẏ∕Y = 𝛼 ⋅ (I∕Y) + 𝛽 ⋅ (L̇∕L)
+ 𝛿�
n
⋅ (Ṅ∕Y) + 𝜃
n
⋅ (Ṅ∕N) ⋅ (P∕Y) + 𝛿�
d
⋅ (Ḋ∕Y) + 𝜃
d
⋅ (Ḋ∕D) ⋅ (P∕Y).
